Ehud Barak

By Jonathan S. Tobin

Not much is known about Ehud Barak, but that which is known is most promising. In particular, he appears to be committed to repairing the very breaches in Israeli society that Bibi Netanyahu delighted in widening. One small example: Where Shimon Peres always looked a bit ridiculous when wearing a kippah, Barak, not less secular a man, does not; had Peres had a victory rally to address, it is hard to imagine him turning, as Barak did in Rabin Square on the night of his impressive electoral victory, to "avinu shebashamyim," our Father in heaven.

Which brings us to the complicated business of coalition-building. It is widely appreciated that Barak cannot rely entirely on the narrow coalition the numbers make possible. The difficult choices that now await require as broad a consensus as possible. Therefore, it is widely expected that Barak will seek to entice either the Likud (19 seats in the Knesset) or Shas (17 seats) to join his government.

The argument for Shas is that peace is the most urgent item on the nation's agenda, and that Shas is dovish in its outlook. The argument against Shas -- in addition to the fact that Meretz (10 seats) has announced its refusal to serve in the same government as Shas -- is that Shas will set too high a price on its participation. A clear majority of Israel's voters oppose the kind of blackmail the religious parties have practiced, and Barak himself has called for an end to the special allocations those parties have enjoyed. The argument for Likud is that a peace endorsed by Likud will be more solidly supported than a peace opposed by it. The argument against Likud is that its hawkishness will make it substantially more difficult to achieve that peace.

Prediction: Barak will negotiate hard to include both Shas and Likud in his governing coalition. Such a government of national unity, if based on clear understandings, would be an ideal solution to the less-than ideal arithmetic of Knesset seats.

The key words are "if based on clear understandings." In the past, broad coalitions have sought to satisfy all the particular demands of their members. This time, Barak can take a tougher line. To Shas: Your choice is now between some or nothing. You can sit outside the government and stew, but if that is your choice, you can expect that the separation of religion and state will proceed apace. On the other hand, if you join with us, you will continue to receive more than your fair share of benefits -- not nearly what you've been used to, but not nothing. The religious status quo will be preserved, but you will have to cease your attacks on the Supreme Court. The tough choices -- conversion, Sabbath observance, marriage and burial -- will continue to be blurred. To Likud: The continuation of the peace process has now been endorsed by a clear and substantial majority of Israelis. You can choose to stand outside that process and oppose it, or you can choose to affect the substance of the peace. Our maps of the future are not all that different. If you want to ensure that I will not retreat too far from those maps, come on board.

Some American Jews will be offended by an invitation to Shas. But if (a big "if") Shas is prepared to enter the government on Barak's terms, Barak thereby scores a major victory. He broadens the base of support for peace; perhaps as important, he reaches out to heal the resentment of the poor Sephardim who are Shas's principal constituency. In the long run, Israel will have to make some exceedingly difficult choices regarding the relationship between religion and state. But, as John Maynard Keynes was fond of observing, we live our lives in the short run. One hopes that the kind of investments in education and job-training that Barak has called for will reduce the resentment, wean some of Shas's supporters away from religious obscurantism and ethnic politics, that the hard choices can be avoided until they become less hard.

And Likud? Barak can hardly turn to Likud alone, given that Likud appears to be on the verge of collapse. Indeed, a decision by Likud to join the government would likely hasten its collapse, driving its more hawkish elements to the National Union camp. Those who would remain are relative pragmatists, much as is Barak himself. The prospect of Ariel Sharon as a government minister in a Barak government is, to say the least, unsettling. Outside, Sharon can merely oppose; inside, he can subvert. Still, support from a residual Likud would be a major bonus along the still very bumpy road to peace. And no one can say with certainty that Sharon himself will not prove to be a pragmatist. (After all, one way of defining a pragmatist is "unprincipled.")

An invitation to both Shas and Likud not only enables Barak to play the one against the other. Far more important, it permits him to begin to redeem his pledge to "be Prime Minister of all the people," and to make good his stated intention to heal Israel's suppurating internal wounds.

Jonathan S. Tobin is executive editor of the Jewish Exponent in Philadelphia. He can be reached at jtobin@jewishexponent.com.