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February 2000 Issue, Volume 4

Israel shouldn't trade strategic depth for an American security blanket

By Jonathan S. Tobin

The deep freeze in the Middle East peace process is making some American and Israeli policy makers very nervous. A sign of that anxiety is there floating this week of one of Israel's earliest foreign-policy fantasies: an official defense pact with the United States.

Israel's early leaders dreamed of a formal defensive alliance that would end the Jewish state's fear of being overwhelmed by its Arab foes and abandoned by its friends in the West. David Ben Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, was keenly aware of Israel's weakness in those years. With indefensible borders, a small population and an even smaller standing army, Israel's strategic posture was one of constant peril. With no real deterrent to attack from its hostile Arab neighbors, Israel was forced to adopt a posture of hair-trigger defense and counterattack. Any mobilization on its borders by neighboring countries (who had all invaded on the day of Israel's birth and who had never accepted its right to exist, let alone accepted peace with it) meant that Israel must not only mobilize in reply but quickly shift to the attack. Israel could not wait to be attacked. By the time it replied to an Arab offensive, it might be too late to save the small Jewish enclave by the Mediterranean.

Though it is difficult for those who grew up after 1967 to understand, Israel was something of a strategic beggar in its first two decades. The United States did not even sell weapons to the Jewish state until the Kennedy administration. Only a short-lived alliance of convenience with France, who looked to Israel as a friend during its unsuccessful war to hold onto Algeria, pierced Israel's total defense isolation.

But, after the 1967 Six-Day War, as Israel proved able to defend itself against all comers, a different sort of alliance became the goal. Like a bank that will not lend someone money until they are rich enough not to need the loan, suddenly Israel was a lot more popular in Washington.

This was due, in part, to a successful mobilization of public opinion here by pro-Israel American Jews and others. But it was primarily due to Israel's strength.

Prior to its astonishing 1967 victory, America's military planners thought of Israel as a strategic liability, a small indefensible country that could only complicate America's relations with the Arab world. After that victory, the Pentagon realized Israel was a valuable strategic asset.

The new concept was one of a loose strategic alliance between Israel and the United States. It especially blossomed during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. This idea called for cooperation against the common threats of Soviet expansionism and Islamic fundamentalism. But, it also left Israel free to defend itself without asking Washington's permission.

On that basis, the alliance has continued, even through the tough times of the Persian Gulf War, when consideration for American interests caused Israel to absorb SCUD attacks from Iraq without retaliating.

However, the impasse in negotiations with both Syria and the Palestinian Authority has led some Israelis and Americans to attempt to paper over with a U.S. defense pact questions about future Israeli security. In exchange for the handover of the Golan and the mountains of Judea and Samaria, Israel would receive American promises. But American protection will not be for free. The protective embrace of American guarantees may comfort war-weary Israelis. But a relationship based on Israeli dependance rather than Israeli strength is bound to work against Israeli interests and inevitably lessen American support for the Jewish state.

While increased cooperation between the two countries is to be welcomed, a formal treaty is another thing entirely. Israel cannot allow its survival to be in the hands of anyone else --even the United States. The cost to Israel's independence, security and dignity from such an arrangement would be incalculable.

Nor would American promises or even increased deliveries of sophisticated American military hardware necessarily be a substitute for strategic depth. Peace deals with the Palestinian Arabs and the Syrians would put Israel back in the same predicament that it was in with its pre-1967 borders. There would be no time for restrained measures in retaliation for terrorism or Arab conventional threats. And the senior partner of the alliance -- the United States -- would always have the last word to prevent Israel from doing what was in its own best interests though not necessarily to the advantage of American relationships with Arab states.

As with other such issues, both sides of this debate can invoke military leaders to back up their arguments. But one doesn't need to be a four-star general to understand that once Israel trades in its free-agent status for enlistment papers in a binding American alliance, its options will be limited. The prime lesson of the Holocaust -- that the fate of the Jews must rest in the hands of the Jews themselves -- would have been discarded in favor of an alliance that might not always serve Israel's best interests. Thus, Israelis and friends of Israel who dream of an American security blanket should be careful of what they wish for. Some of the most well-intentioned ideas can be very dangerous.

Jonathan S. Tobin is executive editor of the Jewish Exponent in Philadelphia. He can be reached at jtobin@jewishexponent.com.